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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this suit against the major American tobacco 
companies, we must decide whether a medical monitoring 
class should be certified under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(2). The District Court decertified a 
proposed class of cigarette smokers on the grounds that 
significant individual issues precluded certification. After 
finding the statute of limitations had run with respect to 
the claims of five named plaintiffs and the sixth had failed 
to establish the need for medical monitoring, the District 
Court granted defendants summary judgment. We will 
affirm the District Court's decertification order and its grant 
of summary judgment. 
 
                                6 
  
I. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Named plaintiffs William Barnes, Catherine Potts, Norma 
Rodweller, Barbara Salzman, Edward J. Slivak, and Ciaran 
McNally are Pennsylvania residents who began smoking 
cigarettes before the age of 15 and have smoked for many 
years. Plaintiffs filed suit against the defendant tobacco 
companies1 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia 
County. Defendants removed to the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, and plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint 
asserting claims of intentional exposure to a hazardous 
substance, negligence, and strict products liability on 
behalf of a purported class of over one million Pennsylvania 
cigarette smokers. In their prayer for relief, plaintiffs asked 
(1) that defendants fund a court-supervised or court- 
approved program providing medical monitoring to class 
members; (2) for punitive damages to create a fund for 
common class-wide purposes, including medical research, 
public education campaigns, and smoking cessation 
programs; and (3) for other monetary and injunctive relief 
the court deemed just and proper. 
 
A. 
 
The District Court found the class did not meet the 
requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3). See Arch v. The 
American Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469 (E.D. Pa. 1997). The 
District Court rejected Rule 23(b)(2) certification because 
plaintiffs had not primarily sought injunctive or equitable 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The defendants are The American Tobacco Company, Inc.; American 
Brands, Inc.; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company; RJR Nabisco, Inc.; Brown 
& Williamson Tobacco Corporation; Philip Morris, Inc.; Philip Morris 
Companies, Inc.; Lorillard Tobacco Company, Inc.; Lorillard, Inc.; United 
States Tobacco Company; UST, Inc.; The Tobacco Institute, Inc.; The 
Council for Tobacco Research-U.S.A., Inc.; Liggett Group, Inc.; Liggett & 
Myers, Inc.; Brooke Group, LTD. Pursuant to the parties' stipulations, 
American Brands, Inc.; Batus, Inc.; Batus Holdings, Inc., Loews 
Corporation, and UST, Inc. have been dismissed from this action without 
prejudice. In addition, B.A.T. Industries p.l.c. was dismissed for lack of 
personal jurisdiction by order of the District Court dated June 21, 1997. 
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relief, finding that "[p]laintiffs' medical monitoring claim is 
merely a thinly disguised claim for future damages" and 
that "the overwhelming majority of the relief sought by 
plaintiffs in their entire complaint is monetary in nature." 
Id. at 484. The court also found certification improper 
under Rule 23(b)(3) because issues common to the class did 
not predominate over plaintiffs' individual issues. In 
particular, the District Court found individual issues, such 
as addiction, causation, the need for medical monitoring, 
and affirmative defenses, made a class action 
unmanageable and not the superior method for fair and 
efficient adjudication of the case. Id. at 485-96. 
 
The District Court suggested, however, that plaintiffs' 
request for a court-supervised program of medical 
monitoring to detect the latent diseases caused by smoking 
was the "paradigmatic" request for injunctive relief under a 
medical monitoring claim. Id. at 484. Specifically, the court 
stated: 
 
        The Court finds that it may properly certify a medical 
       monitoring claim under Rule 23(b)(2) when the 
       plaintiffs seek such specific relief which can be 
       properly characterized as invoking the court's equitable 
       powers. See [Day v. NLO, Inc., 144 F.R.D. 330, 336 
       (S.D. Ohio 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 5 F.3d 154 
       (6th Cir. 1993)]; see also Fried v. Sunguard Recovery 
       Serv., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. Pa. 1996). In 
       reaching this decision, the Court perforce rejects 
       defendants' argument that a medical monitoring claim 
       can never be characterized as injunctive. 
 
        The dispositive factor that must be assessed to 
       determine whether a medical monitoring claim can be 
       certified as a Rule 23(b)(2) class is-what type of relief 
       do plaintiffs actually seek. If plaintiffs seek relief that is 
       a disguised request for compensatory damages, then 
       the medical monitoring claim can only be characterized 
       as a claim for monetary damages. In contrast, if 
       plaintiffs seek the establishment of a court-supervised 
       medical monitoring program through which the class 
       members will receive periodic medical examinations, 
       then plaintiffs' medical monitoring claims can be 
 
                                8 
  
       properly characterized as claim seeking injunctive 
       relief. 
 
        In Day, Judge Spiegel cogently articulates the fine 
       distinction between a medical monitoring claim that 
       seeks monetary relief in the form of compensatory 
       damages and a medical monitoring claim that seeks 
       injunctive relief in the form of a court-supervised 
       medical monitoring program. Judge Spiegel explains: 
 
        Relief in the form of medical monitoring may be by 
       a number of means. First, a court may simply order 
       a defendant to pay a plaintiff a certain sum of 
       money. The plaintiff may or may not choose to use 
       that money to have his medical condition monitored. 
       Second, a court may order the defendants to pay the 
       plaintiffs' medical expenses directly so that a plaintiff 
       may be monitored by the physician of his choice. 
       Neither of these forms of relief constitute injunctive 
       relief as required by Rule 23(b)(2). 
 
       However, a court may also establish an elaborate 
       medical monitoring program of its own, managed by 
       court-appointed court-supervised trustees, pursuant 
       to which a plaintiff is monitored by particular 
       physicians and the medical data produced is utilized 
       for group studies. In this situation, a defendant, of 
       course, would finance the program as well as being 
       required by the Court to address issues as they 
       develop during the program administration. Under 
       these circumstances, the relief constitutes injunctive 
       relief as required by Rule 23(b)(2). 
 
       Day, 144 F.R.D. at 335-36; see also Fried, 925 F. 
       Supp. at 374 (implying that under medical monitoring 
       case law, a creation of a medical monitoring program 
       would be equitable in nature). Based on Judge 
       Spiegel's insightful distinction, it is apparent that relief 
       requested under a medical monitoring claim can be 
       either injunctive or equitable in nature. 
 
        To determine whether the named plaintiffs in this 
       case seek equitable relief under their medical 
       monitoring claim, plaintiffs' specific request for relief 
       under this claim must be closely scrutinized. Plaintiffs 
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       seek the establishment of a court-supervised program 
       through which class members would undergo periodic 
       medical examinations in order to promote the early 
       detection of diseases caused by smoking. This portion 
       of plaintiffs' request is the paradigmatic request for 
       injunctive relief under a medical monitoring claim. 
 
Arch at 483-84. 
 
Accordingly, the District Court granted plaintiffs leave to 
file an amended complaint. In their Second Amended 
Complaint, plaintiffs brought only one claim against 
defendants--medical monitoring.2 Moreover, plaintiffs 
eliminated all requests for smoking cessation programs, 
medical treatment programs, punitive damages, and 
restitutional damages; the only relief they sought was a 
court-supervised fund that would pay for medical 
examinations designed to detect latent diseases caused by 
smoking. Plaintiffs sought certification under Rule 23(b)(2) 
for "[a]ll current residents of Pennsylvania who are cigarette 
smokers as of December 1, 1996 [the day the amended 
complaint was filed in federal court] and who began 
smoking before age 19, while they were residents of 
Pennsylvania." 
 
The Second Amended Complaint alleged that plaintiffs 
and other class members had been exposed to proven 
hazardous substances through the intentional or negligent 
actions of the defendants and/or through defective 
products for which defendants are strictly liable. Plaintiffs 
alleged that as a proximate result of this exposure, they 
and other class members suffer significantly increased risks 
of contracting serious latent diseases and therefore need 
periodic diagnostic medical examinations. Specifically, 
plaintiffs contended that classwide expert evidence would 
prove that: (1) when cigarettes are used as defendants 
intended them to be used, the vast majority of those who 
use cigarettes become addicted and (2) cigarettes are the 
leading cause in the nation of cardiovascular disease, lung 
cancer, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, due to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. As we will discuss more fully below, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
recognized a cause of action for medical monitoring in Redland Soccer 
Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army, 696 A.2d 137 (Pa. 1997). 
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the exposure of the throat, heart, and lungs to tobacco 
smoke. Barnes v. The American Tobacco Co., 176 F.R.D. 
479, 491 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
 
In support of their claim, plaintiffs asserted the following: 
 
       - defendants have sold annually in Pennsylvania 22.6 
       billion cigarettes; 
 
       - there are numerous hazardous substances in 
       cigarette smoke; 
 
       - defendants have known of the relationship between 
       cigarettes and diseases but have concealed their 
       research, publicly denied the relationship between 
       cigarettes and disease, and continue to aggressively 
       promote and sell cigarettes; 
 
       - defendants have known for many years of ways to 
       make safer cigarettes but have intentionally chosen 
       not to do so; 
 
       - defendants have known for many years that nicotine 
       is addictive but have publicly denied both the fact 
       that nicotine is addictive and their knowledge of this 
       fact; 
 
       - defendants have intentionally controlled the level of 
       nicotine and other toxic substances in the cigarettes 
       in order to preserve the dependence of smokers on 
       cigarettes; 
 
       - defendants have used additives such as ammonia, 
       as well as designs for which defendants have sought 
       patents, to make cigarettes a `package' for the 
       delivery of nicotine; 
 
       - defendants have intentionally avoided researching or 
       developing cigarettes that would not cause 
       dependence or addiction in those who use them; 
       and 
 
       - defendants have spent millions of dollars each year 
       in advertising and promoting cigarettes and have 
       geared their efforts particularly to teenagers and 
       children through such efforts as the "Joe Camel" 
       advertising campaign because defendants have 
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       allegedly known that unless a person begins 
       smoking before the age of twenty, the person is 
       unlikely ever to begin. 
 
Plaintiffs' physician experts designed the monitoring 
program using objective medical tests and age-graded 
criteria. They stated that cigarette smoking was the 
principal cause of lung cancer, cardiovascular disease, and 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, the three diseases 
to be monitored. 
 
On August 22, 1997, the District Court conditionally 
certified the class under Rule 23(b)(2). See Barnes v. The 
American Tobacco Co., 176 F.R.D. at 481-93. The court 
held: 
 
        Because defendants have been unable to 
       demonstrate at this point in time that this case is beset 
       with individual issues and manageability problems, the 
       Court finds that plaintiffs' proposed case has the 
       cohesiveness to survive as a Rule 23(b)(2) class. 
       Plaintiffs allege that defendants, acting in concert or 
       pursuant to a common design, have engaged in 
       tortious conduct directed toward the entire class as a 
       whole. Whether or not plaintiffs can prove that 
       defendants have acted in concert or pursuant to a 
       common design is not a proper question to be resolved 
       in a certification motion, rather this merit-based 
       question must be reserved for later proceedings. See 
       [Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 
       (1974)]. However, for purposes of the instant issue sub 
       judice, it is highly relevant that plaintiffs have alleged 
       that defendants have acted in concert or pursuant to a 
       common design. It is this allegation of concerted 
       conduct that supports a finding that defendants have 
       acted on grounds generally applicable to all members 
       of plaintiffs' class. Although there may be individual 
       variations with respect to each class members' 
       relationship with the defendants, the common 
       questions of defendants' liability, which are intimately 
       connected with their concerted conduct, support a 
       finding that defendants have acted on grounds 
       generally applicable to all members of the proposed 
       class. 
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Barnes, 176 F.R.D. at 492-93. 
 
Subsequently, defendants asked the court to certify the 
class certification order for interlocutory appeal or, in the 
alternative, to reconsider the order. They alsofiled motions 
for summary judgment.3 The District Court denied 
defendants' request to certify or reconsider the class 
certification order but decertified the class under Rule 
23(c)(1).4 See Barnes at 493-502. After reviewing the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. On September 22, 1997, while these motions were pending, 
defendants moved to enforce the jury demand. On October 10, 1997, the 
District Court granted the motion for a jury trial. See Barnes v. The 
American Tobacco Co., 989 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Pa. 1997). In reaching 
this decision, the District Court applied the two-part test of Chauffeurs, 
Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990). In 
Terry, the Court noted the Seventh Amendment right to a jury is 
applicable when legal rights are at stake. See id. at 564. "To determine 
whether a particular action will resolve legal rights [the court must] 
examine both the nature of the issues involved and the remedy sought. 
. . . First, [the court must compare] the[ ] action to 18th century 
actions 
brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law 
and equity." Id. at 565 (citation omitted). Second, the court must 
" `examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or 
equitable in nature.' " Id. (citation omitted). 
 
In applying part one of the Terry test, the District Court noted that no 
cause of action for medical monitoring existed in 1791 but determined 
that "the most analogous cause of action is a negligence action for future 
medical expenses" which was an action at law. Thus, the District Court 
concluded, the first line of inquiry "weighs in favor of finding that 
defendants have a right to a jury trial." Barnes v. The American Tobacco 
Co., 989 F. Supp. at 664-65. 
 
Turning to the second line of inquiry under Terry, the District Court 
acknowledged the relief sought is equitable but noted plaintiffs could 
have "just as readily" requested lump sum damages. Plaintiffs' decision 
to pursue a medical monitoring fund instead of damages, the District 
Court concluded, should not deprive the defendants of their 
constitutional right to trial by jury. See id. at 667-68. See Dairy Queen, 
Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1962) ("[T]he constitutional right to 
trial by jury cannot be made to depend upon the choice of words used 
in the pleadings."). 
 
Plaintiffs appeal this order. Because we will affirm the grant of 
summary judgment, we need not decide this issue. 
 
4. An order to certify a class "may be conditional and may be altered or 
amended before the decision on the merits." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1). 
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summary judgment record, the court held "the individual 
issue of addiction, which plaintiffs had previously 
represented as playing no part in this case, is still actually 
part of the present case"; defendants were not barred from 
asserting affirmative defenses; and these and other 
elements in the case presented numerous individual issues 
which "preclude[d] continuing this case as a class action." 
Id. at 500-02. 
 
Specifically, the court found three individual issues 
precluded class certification: addiction, causation, and 
affirmative defenses. First, the court discussed the role of 
addiction: 
 
        When compelled to discuss the substantive issues in 
       the case on defendants' motion for summary judgment, 
       plaintiffs primarily focused on "addiction" and 
       purported nicotine "manipulation. . . ." As was 
       explained in Arch, whether or not an individual is 
       addicted is a highly individualistic inquiry: 
 
        Plaintiffs' own expert Dr. Burns recognizes that the 
       assessment of addiction is an inherently individual 
       inquiry. . . . Based on this statement, defendants 
       argue that class certification under these 
       circumstances would require a mini-hearing on the 
       merits of each individual's case to determine injury. 
       See Forman v. Data Transfer, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 400, 
       403 (E.D. Pa. 1995). Importantly, the Court finds 
       that nowhere in plaintiffs' voluminous submissions 
       do they actually refute that addiction is an 
       inherently individual inquiry. Instead, plaintiffs offer 
       a solution to this massive problem of proving 
       addiction on an individual basis. Plaintiffs propose 
       that once the general issue as to whether cigarettes 
       can cause addiction is resolved, the issue as to 
       whether each and every class member is addicted 
       can be resolved by having them answer a 
       questionnaire, consisting of six simple questions. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Under this rule, District Courts are required to reassess their rulings 
regularly as the case develops. Kuehner v. Heckler, 778 F.2d 152, 163 
(3d Cir. 1985). 
 
                                14 
  
       Defendants rejoin that this questionnaire cannot by 
       itself determine whether a person is nicotine 
       dependent. 
 
        The Court finds that even if the questionnaire were 
       used to determine nicotine dependence, defendants 
       would be permitted to cross-examine each and every 
       class member as to their alleged dependence. 
       Plaintiffs admittedly acknowledge that the plan they 
       propose would be, at most, a prima facie indication 
       of addiction. Plaintiffs' own experts concede that 
       addiction is necessarily an individual inquiry. To 
       refute plaintiffs' prima facie case, defendants would 
       be permitted to cross-examine each individual about 
       his specific choices, decisions and behavior, and 
       defendants would be entitled to offer expert 
       testimony about each person's specific 
       circumstances and diagnosis. 
 
Barnes, 176 F.R.D. at 500 (citing Arch, 175 F.R.D. at 487- 
88). 
 
The District Court also found that causation was an 
individual issue precluding certification. Although plaintiffs 
had narrowed their theories of liability, the court found 
their claim for medical monitoring still implicated the same 
individual issue of causation their First Amended 
Complaint asserted in negligence, strict liability, and 
intentional exposure to a hazardous substance. "[I]nstead of 
completely dropping their claims for negligence, strict 
liability and intentional exposure to a hazardous substance, 
plaintiffs merely inserted these theories as the underlying 
theories of liability for their medical monitoring. Thus, 
these theories, with their attendant individual issues, are 
still in this case." Barnes, 176 F.R.D. at 500. The District 
Court then quoted its June 3, 1997 decision at length: 
 
        To succeed on their products liability and negligence 
       claims, plaintiffs will also have to prove "causation," 
       which the Court finds is not capable of determination 
       on a class-wide basis in this case. Resolution of the 
       "general causation" question of whether cigarettes are 
       capable of being addictive "is not common under Rule 
       23(a)(2)." Kurczi v. Eli Lilly & Co., 160 F.R.D. 667, 677 
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       (N.D. Ohio 1995). Unless it is proven that cigarettes 
       always cause or never cause addiction, "the resolution 
       of the general causation question accomplishes nothing 
       for any individual plaintiff." Id.; see also In re "Agent 
       Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d 145, 165 
       (2d Cir. 1987) (the "relevant question is not whether 
       Agent Orange has the capacity to cause harm," but 
       rather the "highly individualistic" question of whether 
       "it did cause harm and to whom"). 
 
       * * * 
 
        Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the "causation" element of 
       these claims by proving that all cigarettes can 
       potentially cause the user to become addicted. This is 
       a general causation issue. The resolution of this 
       "general causation question" would accomplish nothing 
       for any of the individual plaintiffs. See Kurczi, 160 
       F.R.D. at 677. Indeed, the jury would still be required 
       to determine for each class member whether he or she 
       is addicted to cigarettes, and, if so, whether defendants 
       (and which defendant) caused that addiction. With 
       respect to causation, the Court finds that this issue is 
       highly individualized and does not lend itself to Rule 
       23(b)(2) certification. 
 
        To establish their strict products liability claim, 
       plaintiffs will be required to prove a defect in 
       defendants' products. This inquiry is also highly 
       individualized. Defendants manufactured hundreds of 
       different types of cigarettes over the years and have 
       even made changes within each brand . . . . 
 
        Plaintiffs claim that they can prove a common defect 
       on a class-wide basis for all of defendants' products. 
       Plaintiffs argue that all of defendants' products are 
       inherently defective because they contain sufficient 
       levels of nicotine to cause addiction and other 
       hazardous substances. Thus, plaintiffs will attempt to 
       establish a common defect by showing that this 
       combination exists in all of the cigarettes sold by 
       defendants. Nonetheless, the possibility that plaintiffs' 
       common defect theory will fail and that the class will 
       be splintered into various subclasses--creating 
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       manageability concerns--"weighs against a finding of 
       predominance of common issues." 
 
Barnes, 176 F.R.D. at 500-01 (citing Arch, 175 F.R.D. at 
488-89 (footnotes omitted)). The court concluded, "[b]ecause 
plaintiffs intend to prove their medical monitoring claim by 
using the theories of negligence and strict liability, the 
individual issues, which are implicated by these theories 
still exist, and thus preclude class certification." Barnes, 
176 F.R.D. at 501. 
 
Finally, the court found that affirmative defenses 
available to the defendants raised individual issues.5 The 
court explained: "For example, the defense of assumption of 
risk requires this Court to examine whether each and every 
plaintiff was subjectively aware of the risk and/or danger. 
. . . In determining whether the statute of limitations 
precludes a plaintiff from suing on his claim, the Court 
necessarily would have to examine when plaintiff's injury 
accrued, and whether plaintiff knew or should have known 
of the injury and its cause. This is clearly an individual 
issue. . . . These issues clearly preclude certification." 
Barnes, 176 FRAUD at 502. 
 
B. 
 
The District Court also granted defendants' motions for 
summary judgment, finding the statute of limitations had 
expired for five of the six named plaintiffs and that the 
sixth plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a need for medical 
monitoring. Barnes v. The American Tobacco Co., 984 F. 
Supp. 842 (E.D. Pa. 1997).6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. As we discuss below, in its memorandum opinion disposing of 
defendants' summary judgment motions, the court concluded, over 
plaintiffs' objections, that certain affirmative defenses (e.g. assumption 
of 
risk) are available to the defendants. 
 
6. Defendants also moved for summary judgment on the issue of product 
identification. In granting summary judgment for all defendants the 
District Court did not reach this issue. Defendants Liggett Group Inc., 
Liggett & Myers Inc., and Brooke Group Ltd. joined defendants' joint 
brief but also ask us to affirm on the additional ground that plaintiffs 
failed to produce any evidence that exposure to any Liggett cigarette was 
a substantial factor in causing injury to any of the named plaintiffs. 
Because we will affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment 
to all defendants, we need not reach this issue. 
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Plaintiffs contended their cause of action was governed 
by the equitable doctrine of laches, not the statute of 
limitations. But finding the action "both inherently 
equitable and legal," the District Court held the statute of 
limitations "should apply to this action because plaintiffs 
could have brought this action at law or in equity." Barnes, 
984 F. Supp. at 855. 
 
Examining the theories of liability underlying a medical 
monitoring claim, the District Court applied a two-year 
statute of limitations. In Redland, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held a plaintiff must prove defendant's 
negligence caused his exposure to a proven hazardous 
substance. For this reason, the District Court predicted the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would apply the two-year 
statute of limitations for negligence actions to medical 
monitoring claims. See Barnes, 984 F. Supp. at 856-57 
(citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5524). Furthermore, to the 
extent that plaintiffs base their claims on strict products 
liability or an intentional tort, a two-year statute of 
limitations would still apply. See id. at 857. 
 
In deciding when the claim accrued, the court noted that 
generally, a plaintiff "is under a duty to use all reasonable 
diligence to be properly informed of the facts and 
circumstances upon which a potential right of recovery is 
based and to institute suit within the prescribed statutory 
period." Pocono Int'l Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono Produce, 468 
A.2d 468, 471 (Pa. 1983). A claim under Pennsylvania law 
accrues at "the occurrence of the final significant event 
necessary to make the claim suable." Mack Trucks, Inc. v. 
Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co., 372 F.2d 
18, 20 (3d Cir. 1966). The "discovery rule" is, however, a 
"narrow exception to this general rule," Tohan v. Owens- 
Corning Fiberglass Corp., 696 A.2d 1195, 1200 n. 4 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1997), and tolls the statute of limitations during 
the "plaintiff's complete inability, due to facts and 
circumstances not within his control, to discover an injury 
despite the exercise of due diligence." Kingston Coal Co. v. 
Felton Mining Co., Inc., 690 A.2d 284, 288 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1997). Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations 
begins to run when the "plaintiff knows, or in the exercise 
of reasonable diligence should have known, (1) that he has 
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been injured, and (2) that his injury has been caused by 
another's conduct." Bradley v. Ragheb, 633 A.2d 192, 194 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (quoting MacCain v. Montgomery 
Hosp., 578 A.2d 970, 972-73 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)). 
 
Because a claim under Pennsylvania law accrues at "the 
occurrence of the final significant event necessary to make 
the claim suable," Mack Trucks, 372 F.2d at 20, the court 
found the plaintiffs' medical monitoring cause of action 
accrued when the plaintiffs were placed at a "significantly 
increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease." 
Redland, 696 A.2d at 145. To determine when that event 
occurred, the court examined plaintiffs' expert testimony. 
According to the expert testimony, plaintiffs suffered this 
significantly increased risk when they reached the "twenty 
pack-year" level.7 The court found that five of the six 
plaintiffs were at that level. Thus, the court concluded, 
without applying the discovery rule, the medical monitoring 
claims of these five plaintiffs were barred by the two-year 
statute of limitations. Barnes, 984 F. Supp. at 859-61. 
 
The court found that even applying the discovery rule 
would not save these five plaintiffs' claims because each 
"should have known that smoking cigarettes put him or her 
at a significantly increased risk of contracting a serious 
latent disease years before they filed the instant lawsuit. 
. . . When a Court is asked to apply the discovery rule, the 
relevant question is whether an ordinary person, exercising 
reasonable diligence, would have known or should have 
known of his injury and its cause. In this case, each 
plaintiff should have known or did know that smoking 
caused them to be placed at an increased risk of 
contracting a serious disease." Id. at 862-63. 
 
Reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that Barnes, 
Potts, Rodweller, Salzman, and Slivak had all had notice of 
the dangers of cigarette smoking for more than two years. 
Id. With respect to the sixth plaintiff, McNally, the court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. "Pack-year" refers to the number of years during which an individual 
has smoked a pack of cigarettes per day. For example, a person who 
smokes one pack a day for 10 years has a 10 pack-year history. A 
person smoking half a pack per day for 10 years has a five pack-year 
history. Barnes, 984 F. Supp. at 852 n.6. 
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determined that, since she had only been smoking for 11 
years, her claim could not have accrued until sometime last 
year. See Barnes, 984 F. Supp. at 861 n.14.8 
 
C. 
 
But the District Court granted summary judgment 
against McNally on a different ground, finding she failed to 
demonstrate a need for medical monitoring. With regard to 
McNally, the District Court found: 
 
        Under the Burns Program, Ms. McNally is only 
       entitled to participate in the first level of the proposed 
       medical monitoring program. Under the first level, Ms. 
       McNally would be entitled to receive, annually or bi- 
       annually, a physical examination, cardiovascular risk 
       assessment and an EKG. However, Ms. McNally herself 
       does not seek monitoring in the form of an EKG. (Defs.' 
       Mot. Summ. J. Medical Monitoring Ex. 1 Pls.' Resp. 
       Interrog. 10). Thus, the only monitoring that Ms. 
       McNally seeks, and would be qualified for under the 
       Burns Program, is a physical examination and 
       cardiovascular risk assessment. 
 
       * * * 
 
        Because annual physical examinations and 
       cardiovascular risk assessment are routinely 
       recommended to all persons in the absence of 
       exposure, the Court finds Ms. McNally can not 
       establish that "the prescribed monitoring regime is 
       different from that normally recommended in the 
       absence of the exposure." [Redland, 696 A.2d at 146]. 
       . . . The substance of this requirement is to ensure that 
       "a plaintiff may recover only if the defendant's wrongful 
       acts increased the plaintiff's incremental risk of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Although the District Court applied the Petty-Hyers program's twenty 
pack-year threshold to determine the date upon which a medical 
monitoring claim accrued for the other named plaintiffs, it applied the 
Burns program's ten pack-year threshold to McNally. See Barnes, 984 F. 
Supp. at 860, 861 n.14. Because we conclude that McNally has not 
demonstrated a need for medical monitoring, we do not decide which (if 
either) pack-year threshold is appropriate. 
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       incurring the harm produced by the toxic substance 
       enough to warrant a change in the medical monitoring 
       that otherwise would be prescribed for that plaintiff." 
       [Id. at 144 (citation omitted)]. 
 
        Here, Ms. McNally only seeks monitoring for two 
       tests which would be recommended for her even if she 
       did not smoke. Any increase in Ms. McNally's 
       incremental risk of incurring the harm produced by the 
       allegedly hazardous substances in cigarettes would not 
       warrant a change in the medical monitoring that would 
       be prescribed for her. Indeed, in the absence of 
       exposure, it would be recommended that she receive 
       the tests she seeks under her medical monitoring 
       claim. Thus, she cannot satisfy the sixth element of 
       Redland. 
 
Barnes, 984 F. Supp. at 871-72. 
 
Plaintiffs appealed from the final judgment. 
 
II. 
 
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1332. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
We review the District Court's decision to decertify the 
class for an abuse of discretion. See Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 
F.3d 48, 56 n.15 (3d Cir. 1994). We exercise plenary review 
of a grant of summary judgment. Wicker v. Consol. Rail 
Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 696 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted), 
and apply the same test as the District Court; namely, we 
must determine if there is a "genuine issue as to any 
material fact" and if "the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In so 
doing, we must view all evidence and draw all inferences 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party. Wicker, 142 F.3d at 696 (citation omitted). 
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III. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
A. Medical Monitoring 
 
The crucial issue is whether plaintiffs' medical monitoring 
claim requires inquiry into individual issues. We begin by 
briefly describing the evolution of this cause of action and 
its elements.9 
 
In In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829 
(3d Cir. 1990) (Paoli I), we predicted the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would recognize a cause of action for 
medical monitoring. We reaffirmed that prediction in In re 
Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 
1994) (Paoli II).10 The issue of medical monitoring first 
reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Simmons v. 
Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232 (Pa. 1996), where the unanimous 
court recognized medical monitoring as a viable cause of 
action under Pennsylvania law. In Simmons, the court 
permitted plaintiffs with asbestos-related asymptomatic 
pleural thickening to recover for medical monitoring. It was 
not until Redland Soccer Club v. Department of the Army, 
696 A.2d 137 (Pa. 1997), however, that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court had the opportunity to articulate the 
specific elements of a claim for medical monitoring. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. For another discussion of the evolution of the medical monitoring 
cause of action, see Metro-North R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997). 
 
10. In Paoli I, we predicted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
require a party to meet a four-part test to establish a claim for medical 
monitoring: (1) plaintiff was significantly exposed to a proven hazardous 
substance through the negligent actions of the defendant; (2) as a 
proximate result of exposure, plaintiff suffers a significantly increased 
risk of contracting a serious latent disease; (3) that increased risk 
makes 
periodic diagnostic medical examinations reasonably necessary; and (4) 
monitoring and testing procedures exist which make the early detection 
and treatment of the disease possible and beneficial. Paoli I, 916 F.2d at 
852. In Paoli II, we added another element to the claim, holding that a 
plaintiff had to show that "a reasonable physician would prescribe for 
her or him a monitoring regime different than the one that would have 
been prescribed in the absence of that particular exposure." Paoli II, 35 
F.3d at 788 (citation omitted). 
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Building on this court's decisions in Paoli I and Paoli II, the 
Supreme Court found that plaintiffs must prove the 
following elements: 
 
       (1) exposure greater than normal background levels; (2) 
       to a proven hazardous substance; (3) caused by the 
       defendant's negligence; (4) as a proximate result of the 
       exposure, plaintiff has a significantly increased risk of 
       contracting a serious latent disease; (5) a monitoring 
       procedure exists that makes the early detection of the 
       disease possible; (6) the prescribed monitoring regime 
       is different from that normally recommended in the 
       absence of the exposure; and (7) the prescribed 
       monitoring regime is reasonably necessary according to 
       contemporary scientific principles. 
 
Redland, 696 A.2d at 145-46.11  
 
The injury in a cause of action for medical monitoring is 
the "costs of periodic medical examinations necessary to 
detect the onset of physical harm." Id. at 144; see also 
Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 
F.2d 816, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("It is difficult to dispute 
that an individual has an interest in avoiding expensive 
diagnostic examinations just as he or she has an interest in 
avoiding physical injury."); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply 
Co., 858 P.2d 970, 977 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted) 
("Although the physical manifestations of an injury may not 
appear for years, the reality is that many of those exposed 
have suffered some legal detriment; the exposure itself and 
the concomitant need for medical testing constitute the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Other jurisdictions have authorized recovery for medical monitoring 
in the absence of physical injury. See, e.g., Bourgeois v. A.P. Green 
Indus., 716 So.2d 355 (La. 1998); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 
863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 
970 (Utah 1993); Ayers v. Township of Jackson , 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 
1987). In addition, some federal courts predicting state law have reached 
the same conclusion. See Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468 
(D. Colo. 1991); Johnson v. Armstrong Cork Co., 645 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. 
La. 1986). But see Ball v. Joy Techs., Inc., 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that, under the laws of Virginia and West Virginia, recovery of 
medical monitoring expenses is only available where a plaintiff has 
sustained a physical injury); Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887 
(D. Minn. 1990). 
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injury."). It is evident that this injury is somewhat different 
from an injury in a traditional tort, which rests on physical 
harm. See, e.g., Restatement Second of Torts S 402A 
(requiring plaintiff to prove in a products liability case 
"physical harm" which S 7 defines as "physical impairment 
of the human body"); Simmons, 674 A.2d at 237 (denying 
plaintiffs recovery other than medical monitoring for 
asymptomatic pleural thickening because inter alia 
plaintiffs demonstrated no physical injury). In recognizing 
medical monitoring as a compensable injury, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court quoted at length from our 
distinction in Paoli I between a cause of action for increased 
risk of future harm and a cause of action for medical 
monitoring. We concluded that a claim for medical 
monitoring is different from a claim for increased risk of 
harm because the medical monitoring plaintiff has an 
identifiable rather than a speculative injury. Id. at 850-51. 
We explained: 
 
       The injury in an enhanced risk claim is the anticipated 
       harm itself. The injury in a (medical monitoring claim 
       is the cost of the medical care that will, one hopes, 
       detect that injury. The former is inherently speculative 
       because courts are forced "to anticipate the probability 
       of future injury. The latter is much less speculative 
       because the issue for the jury is the less conjectural 
       question of whether the plaintiff needs medical 
       surveillance. 
 
Paoli I, 916 F.2d at 851.12 
 
In Redland, the court cited four important policy reasons 
for recognizing a cause of action for medical monitoring. 
First, medical monitoring promotes "early diagnosis and 
treatment of disease resulting from exposure to toxic 
substances caused by a tortfeasor's negligence." Second, 
"[a]llowing recovery for such expenses avoids the potential 
injustice of forcing an economically disadvantaged person 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. There is no doubt the costs of medical monitoring are a compensable 
portion of a plaintiffs' damages when asserted with other injury claims. 
It appears, however, that allowing plaintiffs to recover in the absence of 
some injury pushes the limit of the Constitution's case-or-controversy 
requirement. 
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to pay for expensive diagnostic examinations necessitated 
by another's negligence," and "affords toxic-tort victims, for 
whom other sorts of recovery may prove difficult, immediate 
compensation for medical monitoring needed as a result of 
exposure." Third, medical monitoring "furthers the 
deterrent function of the tort system by compelling those 
who expose others to toxic substances to minimize risks 
and costs of exposure." Finally, such recovery is"in 
harmony with `the important public health interest in 
fostering access to medical testing for individuals whose 
exposure to toxic chemicals creates an enhanced risk of 
disease.' " Id. at 145 (citations omitted). 
 
B. Certification 
 
To be certified, a class must satisfy the prerequisites of 
Rule 23(a) and the "parties seeking certification must also 
show that the action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(1), 
(2), or (3)." Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, ___ U.S. ___; 
117 S. Ct. 2231, 2245 (1997). Plaintiffs seek certification 
under 23(b)(2). 
 
As noted, the District Court conditionally certified the 
class, stipulating its order could be altered or amended. See 
Barnes v. The American Tobacco Co., 176 FRAUD 479 (E.D. 
Pa. 1997); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1). Under Rule 23(c)(1), 
District Courts are required to reassess their class rulings 
as the case develops. Kuehner v. Heckler, 778 F.2d 152, 
163 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Richardson v. Byrd, 709 F.2d 
1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Under Rule 23 the district 
court is charged with the duty of monitoring its class 
decisions in light of the evidentiary development of the 
case. The district judge must define, redefine, subclass, and 
decertify as appropriate in response to the progression of 
the case from assertion to facts."). In accordance with 
23(c)(1), the District Court examined the evidence adduced 
for summary judgment purposes and decided to decertify 
the class. Barnes, 176 FRAUD at 502. 
 
In considering whether certification is proper, we refrain 
from conducting a preliminary inquiry into the merits. See 
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1973) 
(citation omitted) (" `In determining the propriety of a class 
action, the question is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs 
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have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, 
but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met.' ") 
At the same time, we must carefully examine the factual 
and legal allegations. See General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 
U.S. 147, 160 (1981) ("[S]ometimes it may be necessary for 
the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to 
rest on the certification question."); Coopers & Lybrand v. 
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1977) (citation omitted) ("[T]he 
class determination generally involves considerations that 
are `enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising 
the plaintiff's cause of action.' "). 
 
       1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) 
 
Rule 23(a) presents four requirements: (1) numerosity; (2) 
commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of 
representation.13 "The requirements of Rule 23(a) are meant 
to assure both that class action treatment is necessary and 
efficient and that it is fair to the absentees under the 
particular circumstances." Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 
55 (3d Cir. 1994). The District Court determined the class 
satisfied Rule 23(a). 
 
Finding the putative class consisted of more than one 
million Pennsylvania residents,14 the court held the class 
was "so numerous that joinder of all members[is] 
impracticable." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Defendants do not 
dispute that numerosity is satisfied. 
 
The District Court also found plaintiffs satisfied the 
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) because they 
demonstrated there is at least one common question of law 
or fact. See Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 56 ("The commonality 
requirement will be satisfied if the named plaintiffs share at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Specifically, Rule 23(a) provides: "One or more members of a class 
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) 
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) 
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or 
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class." 
 
14. In defendants' post-hearing memorandum, defendants place the 
number of potential class members at 2.8 million. 
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least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the 
prospective class.").15 "For example, whether defendants 
have acted in concert or pursuant to a common design is 
one common question." Arch, 175 FRAUD at 477.16 
 
"The concepts of commonality and typicality are broadly 
defined and tend to merge." Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d at 
56 (citation omitted). The typicality requirement is designed 
to align the interests of the class and the class 
representatives so that the latter will work to benefit the 
entire class through the pursuit of their own goals. Id. at 
57. This requirement does not mandate that all putative 
class members share identical claims. Id. at 56 (citations 
omitted). Moreover, "[f]actual differences will not render a 
claim atypical if the claim arises from the same event or 
practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims 
of the class members, and if it is based on the same legal 
theory." 1 Newberg on Class Actions S 3.15, at 3-78; see 
also Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 58 ("[E]ven relatively 
pronounced factual differences will generally not preclude a 
finding of typicality where there is a strong similarity of 
legal theories."). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. In Georgine, the court recognized that Baby Neal and other Third 
Circuit cases "stated a very low threshold for commonality." Georgine v. 
Amchem Prods. Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 627 (3d Cir. 1996). The court noted 
that the "commonality barrier is higher in a personal injury damages 
class action, like [Georgine], that seeks to resolve all issues, including 
noncommon issues, of liability and damages." Id. Ultimately, the court 
did not decide whether that class met the commonality requirement and 
concluded instead that "the commonality requirement is subsumed by 
the predominance requirement, which this class cannot conceivably 
meet." Id. As the District Court noted, in contrast to Georgine, this case 
is not a personal injury damages class action, nor does it involve a 
settlement class that was national in scope, where class members are 
asked to compromise future claims without knowing what those claims 
might be. Thus, the District Court did not impose a higher commonality 
requirement. See Arch, 175 FRAUD at 476-77. 
 
16. In addition, the District Court found that"whether defendants' 
actions and omissions in the manufacture, promotion and sale of 
cigarettes to class members have been sufficiently egregious to warrant 
the imposition of punitive damages" is also a common question. Arch, 
175 FRAUD at 477. Of course, the plaintiffs have since dropped their 
demand for punitive damages so this is no longer a common issue. 
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The District Court found plaintiffs met the typicality 
requirement. Although defendants had demonstrated there 
"exist many individualized questions which arise from the 
factual differences between the putative class members' 
individual claims, defendants fail[ed] to demonstrate that 
the `legal theories of the named plaintiffs potentially conflict 
with those of the absentees . . . .' " Arch, 175 FRAUD at 479 
(quoting Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 57). Specifically, the District 
Court found: 
 
       "Plaintiffs allege that their claims arise from the same 
       course of conduct undertaken by defendants. 
       Specifically, plaintiffs have alleged that defendants 
       have engaged in a concerted course of conduct 
       whereby defendants have concealed their knowledge of 
       nicotine's addictive properties and have purposefully 
       and deliberately emphasized efforts to addict children 
       and adolescents--resulting in an epidemic pediatric 
       disease. In this process, plaintiffs allege that these 
       consumers were involuntar[il]y subject to the 
       cumulative, repetitive assault of the many different 
       carcinogens contained in tobacco smoke. Although 
       plaintiffs' claims may be factually different, plaintiffs 
       have alleged a course of conduct that has given rise to 
       plaintiffs' claims which are based upon the same legal 
       theories, thus satisfying the typicality requirement of 
       Rule 23(a)(3)." 
 
Arch, 175 FRAUD at 478-79. 
 
Finally, the District Court found that plaintiffs "fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class." Id. at 480 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)). The adequacy of 
representation requirement encompasses two distinct 
inquiries designed to protect the interests of absentee class 
members. First, it "tests the qualifications of the counsel to 
represent the class." G.M. Trucks, 55 F.3d at 800. Second, 
it "serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named 
parties and the class they seek to represent." Amchem, 117 
S. Ct. at 2250.17 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. In the District Court, defendants claimed the named plaintiffs were 
not adequate class representatives because (1) they have split their 
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       2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) 
 
A class action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(2) when 
"the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on 
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making 
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding 
declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole." Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Subsection (b)(2) class actions are 
"limited to those class actions seeking primarily injunctive 
or corresponding declaratory relief." 1 Newberg on Class 
Actions S 4.11, at 4-39. The (b)(2) class "serves most 
frequently as the vehicle for civil rights actions and other 
institutional reform cases that receive class action 
treatment." Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 58-59 (3d Cir. 
1994). Indeed, (b)(2) was "designed specifically for civil 
rights cases seeking broad declaratory or injunctive relief 
for a numerous and often unascertainable or amorphous 
class of persons." 1 Newberg on Class Actions S 4.11, at 4- 
39. 
 
As noted, in its June 3, 1997 Order, the District Court 
found that under certain circumstances medical monitoring 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
causes of action and (2) they may have failed to make a knowing and 
voluntary amendment to their complaint. The District Court found these 
claims were not "split" or "waived" by the absent class members. In its 
August 22, 1997 order, the court found: "the Court has already 
determined that the absent class members cannot bring in this putative 
class action those claims which have been omitted from the Second 
Amended Complaint because those claims are not suitable for class 
action treatment. Consequently, there cannot be any`splitting' or `waiver' 
by these absent class members: there is no other cause of action they 
can bring, or could have brought, in this action, except possibly the 
medical monitoring claim set forth in the Second Amended Complaint." 
176 FRAUD at 485. In addition, after reviewing plaintiffs' deposition 
testimony, the District Court found that the named plaintiffs made a 
knowing and voluntary amendment. The court noted that it is 
"unrealistic . . . to require the named plaintiffs to have an in-depth 
understanding as to the legal theories behind their claim." Instead, 
"courts have required the class representatives to actively seek 
vindication of his or her rights and engage competent counsel to 
prosecute the claims. In this case, named plaintiffs have actively sought 
vindication of their rights on a class-wide basis and have engaged 
competent counsel to litigate their claims." Id. at 486. 
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could constitute the injunctive relief required by Rule 
23(b)(2). Arch, 175 FRAUD at 483. The District Court 
initially held that plaintiffs could not be certified under 
23(b)(2) because most of the relief they sought was 
monetary in nature. Arch, 175 FRAUD at 484. In response 
to the court's analysis, plaintiffs amended their complaint 
so it contained only a claim for medical monitoring and 
asked only for the establishment of a court-supervised 
medical monitoring program. 
 
Recently, the Supreme Court reexamined the 
requirements for Rule 23 certification in the context of 
mass tort class actions. In Amchem Products, Inc. v. 
Windsor, ___ U.S. ___; 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997), the Supreme 
Court affirmed our decision in Georgine v. Amchem 
Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), decertifying a 
settlement class of claimants exposed to asbestos. As in 
this case, the issue in Amchem was "whether [the] proposed 
classes [were] sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication 
by representation." Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2249. We found 
that cohesiveness lacking and the Supreme Court agreed. 
Quoting Judge Becker's opinion, the Court noted: " `Class 
members were exposed to different asbestos-containing 
products, for different amounts of time, in different ways, 
and over different periods . . . . The [exposure-only] 
plaintiffs especially share little in common, either with each 
other or with the presently injured class members . . . . 
They will also incur different medical expenses because 
their monitoring and treatment will depend on singular 
circumstances and individual medical histories.' " Id. at 
2250 (quoting Georgine, 83 F.3d at 626). As we explained, 
such factual differences "translate into significant legal 
differences. Differences in amount of exposure and nexus 
between exposure and injury lead to disparate applications 
of legal rules, including matters of causation, comparative 
fault, and the types of damages available to each plaintiff." 
Georgine, 83 F.3d at 627. We also noted that 
"individualized issues can become overwhelming in actions 
involving long-term mass torts (i.e. those which do not arise 
out of a single accident)." Id. at 628. 
 
While Amchem involved a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, the 
cohesiveness requirement enunciated by both this court 
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and the Supreme Court extends beyond Rule 23(b)(3) class 
actions. Indeed, a (b)(2) class may require more 
cohesiveness than a (b)(3) class. This is so because in a 
(b)(2) action, unnamed members are bound by the action 
without the opportunity to opt out. 
 
While 23(b)(2) class actions have no predominance or 
superiority requirements, it is well established that the 
class claims must be cohesive. Discussing the requirements 
for 23(b)(2) classes in Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Company, 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1974), we noted, "[b]y its 
very nature, a (b)(2) class must be cohesive as to those 
claims tried in the class action. . . . Because of the cohesive 
nature of the class, Rule 23(c)(3) contemplates that all 
members of the class will be bound. Any resultant 
unfairness to the members of the class was thought to be 
outweighed by the purposes behind class actions: 
eliminating the possibility of repetitious litigation and 
providing small claimants with a means of obtaining 
redress for claims too small to justify individual litigation." 
Id. at 248-49 (citations omitted). In Geraghty v. United 
States Parole Commission, 719 F.2d 1199, 1205-06 (3d Cir. 
1983) (citation omitted), we again emphasized that a 
23(b)(2) class must be cohesive, noting the District Court 
has the "discretion to deny certification in Rule 23(b)(2) 
cases in the presence of `disparate factual circumstances.' " 
See also Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 72 FRAUD 619, 
628 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (holding that a "court should be more 
hesitant in accepting a (b)(2) suit which contains significant 
individual issues than it should under subsection 23(b)(3)"); 
Rice v. City of Philadelphia, 66 FRAUD 17, 20 (E.D. Pa. 
1974) (holding that a case should not proceed as a (b)(2) 
action where "virtually all of the issues would have to be 
litigated individually in order to determine whether a 
particular alleged class member was entitled to any 
damages at all").18 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. "At base, the (b)(2) class is distinguished from the (b)(3) class by 
class cohesiveness. . . . Injuries remedied through (b)(2) actions are 
really group, as opposed to individual injuries. The members of a (b)(2) 
class are generally bound together through `preexisting or continuing 
legal relationships' or by some significant common trait such as race or 
gender." Holmes v. Continental Can Company, 706 F.2d 1144, 1155 
(11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Note, Notice in Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions for 
Monetary Relief: Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 128 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1236, 
1252-53 (1980) (footnotes omitted). 
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In Santiago, the court recognized two reasons why courts 
must determine whether a proposed (b)(2) class implicates 
individual issues. First, unnamed members with valid 
individual claims are bound by the action without the 
opportunity to withdraw and may be prejudiced by a 
negative judgment in the class action. "Thus, the court 
must ensure that significant individual issues do not 
pervade the entire action because it would be unjust to 
bind absent class members to a negative decision where the 
class representatives's claims present different individual 
issues than the claims of the absent members present." 
Second, "the suit could become unmanageable and little 
value would be gained in proceeding as a class action . . . 
if significant individual issues were to arise consistently." 
Santiago, 72 FRAUD at 628. 
 
In decertifying the class, the District Court decided that 
"too many individual issues exist which prevent this case 
from proceeding as a class action." Barnes, 176 FRAUD at 
500. As noted, the District Court found that addiction, 
causation, and affirmative defenses all presented individual 
issues not properly decided in a class action. We believe 
that addiction, causation, the defenses of comparative and 
contributory negligence, the need for medical monitoring 
and the statute of limitations present too many individual 
issues to permit certification. As in Amchem, plaintiffs were 
"exposed to different . . . products, for different amounts of 
time, in different ways, and over different periods." See 
Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2250 (citation omitted). These 
disparate issues make class treatment inappropriate.19 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. We note that the individual issues raised by cigarette litigation 
often 
preclude class certification. See, e.g., Castano v. The American Tobacco 
Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifying 23(b)(3) class because 
individual issues predominated); Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 174 FRAUD 90 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (denying certification under 
23(b)(1), (2) & (3) because of the presence of individual issues); Ruiz v. 
The American Tobacco Co., No. 96-2300 (JAF) (D.P.R. March 17, 1998) 
(denying certification under 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) because "cigarette 
addiction" claims raised too many individual issues). Significantly, no 
federal appeals court has upheld the certification a class of cigarette 
smokers or reversed a District Court's refusal to certify such a class. In 
some state cases, however, plaintiff smokers have succeeded in 
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       a. Nicotine addiction and causation 
 
The District Court found nicotine addiction plays a 
central role in the case and that addiction is a "highly 
individualistic inquiry." Barnes, 176 F.R.D. at 500. The 
District Court noted that when plaintiffs were "compelled to 
discuss the substantive issues in the case on defendants' 
motion for summary judgment, [they] primarily focused on 
`addiction' and purported nicotine `manipulation. . . .' " Id. 
While plaintiffs do not seem to dispute that addiction 
requires an individual inquiry, they maintain nonetheless 
that addiction plays no part in the case. 
 
Plaintiffs contend that throughout the litigation, they 
have 
 
       asserted that defendants' knowledge and intentional 
       misuse of the addictive properties of nicotine--their 
       intentional design of cigarettes to contain a level of 
       nicotine they knew would be addictive--went to their 
       intentional misconduct and liability for designing a 
       defective product. Plaintiffs do not contend that all 
       smokers are addicted, that addiction is a pre-requisite 
       to class membership, or that addiction is determinant 
       of a need for medical monitoring. Addiction is a term 
       and concept that is difficult to avoid in any smoking 
       case. The documents show that defendants intended 
       and designed cigarettes to be addictive. That they have 
       largely succeeded may be all too apparent. But the 
       addiction of any particular smoker--much less the 
       class as a whole--is simply not an element of plaintiffs' 
       claims. 
 
Brief of Appellant at 41. 
 
We disagree. Addiction remains an essential part of 
plaintiffs' claim. In order to prevail on their medical 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
certification. See Richardson v. Phillip Morris, No. 96145050/CE212596 
(Baltimore Cir. Ct. Jan. 28, 1998) (certifying class of Maryland smokers 
seeking compensatory and punitive damages); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 
v. Engle, 672 So.2d 39 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1996), rev. denied, 682 So.2d 
1100 (1996) (certification of state-wide class of tobacco smokers suing 
for damages caused by smoking). 
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monitoring claim--under any of their three theories of 
liability (negligence, strict products liability, and intentional 
exposure to a hazardous substance)--plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that defendants caused their exposure to 
tobacco. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 145-46. Indeed, 
plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint alleges "[p]laintiffs 
and class members have been significantly exposed to 
proven hazardous substances through the intentional or 
negligent actions of the Defendants, and/or through 
defective products for which Defendants are strictly liable" 
and that "[a]s a proximate result of this exposure, Plaintiffs 
and class members suffer significantly increased risks of 
contracting serious latent diseases." Second Amended 
Complaint PP 20-21. 
 
It is apparent from plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 
as well as their omnibus response to the defendants' joint 
motions for summary judgment that addiction is the 
linchpin of causation in this case. According to plaintiffs' 
complaint, defendants' actions that give rise to liability 
include the following: 
 
       -  Defendants have . . . known for many years that 
       nicotine is addictive, but have publicly denied both 
       the fact that nicotine is addictive and their 
       knowledge of this fact, in order to conceal the 
       addictive nature of cigarettes from the public, 
       including Plaintiffs and the class. . . . 
 
       -  During the same time that Defendants have 
       publicly denied the addictive nature of nicotine, 
       Defendants have intentionally controlled the level of 
       nicotine and other toxic substances they have sold, 
       in order to preserve the dependence of smokers on 
       cigarettes that Defendants sell. To this end, 
       Defendants have utilized additives such as 
       ammonia, as well as designs for which Defendants 
       have sought patents, to make cigarettes, in effect, a 
       "package" for the delivery of nicotine. Defendants 
       have intentionally sought to "increase the delivery of 
       nicotine and almost double the nicotine transfer 
       efficiency of cigarettes," maintain "the proper 
       amount of nicotine in tobacco smoke," and "deliver 
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       a pharmacologically active dose of nicotine to the 
       smoker." 
 
       -  During the same period of time, despite this 
       voluntary and public undertaking to protect the 
       public's "health as a basic responsibility paramount 
       to every other consideration," Defendants have also 
       intentionally avoided researching or developing 
       cigarettes that would not cause dependence or 
       addiction in those who use them. 
 
       -  In their efforts to conceal the health hazards of 
       smoking and the addictive nature of nicotine, 
       Defendants have testified falsely under oath before 
       the United States Congress, provided false 
       explanations to customers and governmental 
       entities about the health hazards of tobacco and the 
       harmful qualities of nicotine; concealed their secret 
       research and testing on the dangers of cigarette 
       smoking; [and] concealed their deliberate 
       manipulation of the nicotine levels of cigarettes. .. . 
 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint PP 12-14, 16. 
 
Moreover, as the District Court pointed out, in their 
omnibus response to the defendants' joint motions for 
summary judgment, plaintiffs focused on addiction and 
purported nicotine manipulation. Plaintiffs asserted the 
evidence will establish inter alia that (1) defendants 
intentionally designed cigarettes to addict smokers; (2) 
defendants allowed the number of addicted smokers to 
grow, knowing full well that the smoke caused cancer and 
lung disease; and (3) defendants intentionally manipulated 
and controlled nicotine levels. As we understand plaintiffs' 
theory, defendants' actions caused plaintiffs to become 
addicted to cigarettes and thereby rendered their choice to 
smoke nonvoluntary. 
 
Plaintiffs suggest that causation can be proved on a 
class-wide basis, contending they need to show only that 
smoking cigarettes was a "substantial factor" in "causing" 
the three diseases to be monitored in the program. See 
Parks v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 113 F.3d 1327, 1332 (3d Cir. 
1997) (under Pennsylvania law, a "substantial factor" is 
legal cause, and requires only proof that a factor is "not 
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merely negligible" in producing a result). Plaintiffs point to 
the Surgeon General's Reports conclusively determining 
that cigarette smoking is the major cause of the diseases 
for which the medical monitoring program was constructed. 
This evidence, they claim, more than satisfies their burden 
on the issue of causation. 
 
But plaintiffs cannot prove causation by merely showing 
that smoking cigarettes causes cancer and other diseases. 
They must demonstrate that defendants' intentional or 
negligent nicotine manipulation caused each individual 
plaintiff to have a significantly increased risk of contracting 
serious latent diseases thereby demonstrating the need for 
medical monitoring. Alternatively, under a strict products 
liability theory, as the District Court found, "each class 
member will have to establish that the type of cigarettes he 
or she smoked contained a defect at the time he or she 
smoked them." Barnes, 176 F.R.D. at 501 (citation 
omitted). According to plaintiffs, the alleged defect is that 
defendants intentionally designed these cigarettes to be 
addictive. But whether defendants caused the injury 
depends on whether each individual actually is addicted. 
These are all issues that must be determined on an 
individual basis. 
 
We note that plaintiffs do not contest the District Court's 
conclusion that "whether or not an individual is addicted is 
a highly individualistic inquiry." Barnes, 176 F.R.D. at 500. 
Instead, plaintiffs suggested to the District Court that once 
the general issue whether cigarettes can cause addiction is 
resolved, they could resolve the issue of individual 
addiction by having each class member answer a 
questionnaire consisting of six questions.20 The District 
Court noted that 
 
        even if the questionnaire were used to determine 
       nicotine dependence, defendants would be permitted to 
       cross-examine each and every class member as to their 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. On appeal, plaintiffs refer only sparingly to their proposed trial 
plan. 
At one point in their brief, however, plaintiffs suggest the District 
Court 
erred when it "did not refer or consider plaintiffs' proposed trial plan 
at 
all in decertifying the class" because of the many individual issues. But 
the District Court clearly considered the plan and found it inadequate. 
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       alleged dependence. Plaintiffs admittedly acknowledge 
       that the plan they propose would be, at most, a prima 
       facie indication of addiction. Plaintiffs' own (experts 
       concede that addiction is necessarily an individual 
       inquiry. To refute plaintiffs' prima facie case, 
       defendants would be permitted to cross-examine each 
       individual about his specific choices, decisions and 
       behavior, and defendants would be entitled to offer 
       expert testimony about each person's specific 
       circumstances and diagnosis. 
 
Arch, 175 F.R.D. at 488. 
 
Because nicotine addiction must be determined on an 
individual basis and remains an essential part of plaintiffs' 
medical monitoring claim, we agree with the District Court 
that class treatment is inappropriate. 
 
       b. The need for medical monitoring 
 
We also believe the requirement that each class member 
demonstrate the need for medical monitoring precludes 
certification. In order to state a claim for medical 
monitoring, each class member must prove that the 
monitoring program he requires is "different from that 
normally recommended in the absence of exposure." 
Redland, 696 A.2d at 146.21 To satisfy this requirement, 
each plaintiff must prove the monitoring program that is 
prescribed for the general public and the monitoring 
program that would be prescribed for him. Although the 
general public's monitoring program can be proved on a 
classwide basis, an individual's monitoring program by 
definition cannot. In order to prove the program he 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. See also Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 788; Arch, 175 F.R.D. at 490 ("The fact 
that [Barnes] smokes would not require any additional monitoring for 
heart disease not already warranted by the multiple, significant risk 
factors for heart disease he already has."); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979-80 (Utah 1993); Supplemental 
Declaration of David Burns, M.D. ("Exercise stress testing and an EKG 
would not normally be recommended for nonsmokers at the ages 
recommended in the proposed monitoring program, unless they had 
some other risk factor that placed them at dramatically increased risk of 
disease."). 
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requires, a plaintiff must present evidence about his 
individual smoking history and subject himself to cross- 
examination by the defendant about that history. This 
element of the medical monitoring claim therefore raises 
many individual issues. 
 
       c. Defenses 
 
The District Court also held that defenses raise individual 
issues precluding certification. Over plaintiffs' objection, the 
District Court found defendants may assert the defenses of 
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and consent to 
exposure to a hazardous substance. Barnes, 984 F. Supp. 
at 867-69.22 After reviewing Pennsylvania caselaw, the 
District Court concluded 
 
       First, legal defenses do not become equitable defenses 
       simply because they are asserted in an action in 
       equity. Second, equitable principles such as the 
       doctrine of unclean hands may not be used to deprive 
       a defendant of legal rights--remedies or defenses. 
       Applying these lessons, the Court finds that defendants 
       have a legitimate right to raise the legal defenses of 
       contributory negligence, assumption of risk and 
       consent. 
 
Barnes, 984 F. Supp. at 866. The court noted this suit was 
not purely equitable but instead "implicates both legal and 
equitable rights" making it "even less appropriate for [the 
court] to exercise its equitable powers to bar defendants 
from asserting its affirmative, legal defenses." Id. 
 
As noted, plaintiffs asserted three theories of liability. 
They claimed that they were significantly exposed to proven 
hazardous substances through defendants' intentional 
actions, negligent actions, and defective products (strict 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. Defendants moved for summary judgment against Ciaran McNally, 
William Barnes, and Catherine Potts on the grounds that their claims 
were barred by contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and consent 
to exposure to a hazardous substance. Barnes, 984 F. Supp. at 864. The 
District Court only considered the defendants' arguments against 
McNally because it entered summary judgment against Barnes and Potts 
on statute of limitations grounds. 
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liability). Defendants assert the defenses of consent, 
comparative negligence, and assumption of risk. Plaintiffs 
contend that these defenses are not available and that 
individual issues relating to these defenses should not 
preclude class certification. Plaintiffs maintain that 
"comparative negligence" is only available in actions for 
damages resulting in death or injury, that assumption of 
risk is not available because the defendants will not be able 
to show that any plaintiff assumed the risk of the specific 
defect, and that consent requires a full awareness of 
defendants' specific conduct and there is no record 
evidence of such awareness in this case. 
 
The District Court found defendants could raise the 
defense of comparative negligence, predicting the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would apply Pennsylvania's 
Comparative Negligence Act23 rather than contributory 
negligence to a medical monitoring claim. See Barnes, 984 
F. Supp. at 867-68. Although acknowledging that the 
Comparative Negligence Act expressly applies to"actions 
brought to recover damages for negligence resulting in 
death or injury to person or property," and that plaintiffs 
seek a court-supervised monitoring program, the District 
Court found "[t]he application of the Comparative 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 7102 provides: 
 
(a) General rule.--In all actions brought to  recover damages for 
negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, the fact 
that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall 
not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or his legal representative where such 
negligence was not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant 
or defendants against whom recovery is sought, but any damages 
sustained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the 
amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff. 
 
(b) Recovery against joint defendant; contribution.--Where recovery 
is allowed against more than one defendant, each defendant shall be 
liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages 
in the ratio of the amount of his causal negligence to the amount of 
causal negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is 
allowed. The plaintiff may recover the full amount of the allowed recovery 
from any defendant against whom the plaintiff is not barred from 
recovery. Any defendant who is so compelled to pay more than his 
percentage share may seek contribution. 
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Negligence Act to these claims would more properly 
advance the goals of the Redland Soccer court, and would 
also adequately protect the rights of defendants." Barnes, 
984 F. Supp. at 867-68. The District Court reasoned that 
plaintiffs could have requested lump sum damages which 
would have clearly invoked the Comparative Negligence Act; 
that plaintiffs asked for equitable relief instead of damages 
is not dispositive. Furthermore, because Redland expressly 
encouraged the use of medical monitoring funds, 696 A.2d 
at 142 n.6, the District Court predicted the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would not apply the "harsh" and 
"anachronistic doctrine of contributory negligence" to 
medical monitoring claims seeking equitable relief. Barnes, 
984 F. Supp. at 868. 
 
We need not decide whether the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would apply the Comparative Negligence Act to 
plaintiffs' negligence claim. If the Comparative Negligence 
Act does not apply, defendants still have the defense of 
contributory negligence available to them. See 
Commonwealth Fed. Sav. and Loan Assoc. v. Pettit, 586 
A.2d 1021, 1026 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1991) ("The doctrine of 
contributory negligence continues to be applicable to 
situations where both parties are negligent but the 
resulting injury is not covered under the Pennsylvania 
Comparative Negligence Act.").24 Either defense will raise 
many individual issues.25 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, the tort of intentional exposure 
to hazardous substances is predicated on a theory of 
battery. See Field v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 565 A.2d 1170, 
1178 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). Plaintiffs must prove as a 
constituent element they did not consent to the tortious 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. For purposes of our certification inquiry, we need not decide whether 
these defenses bar plaintiffs' recovery. Instead, we merely conclude that 
one of these defenses is available to the defendants. 
 
25. We acknowledge that the existence of affirmative defenses as to some 
class members may not by itself enough warrant the denial of 
certification. See Merk v. Jewel Food Stores Div., Jewel Companies, Inc., 
702 F. Supp. 1391, 1395 (E.D. Ill. 1988); Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 
279, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). But we note that the defenses are only one of 
many matters raising individual issues in this case. 
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conduct. See Levenson v. Souser, 557 A.2d 1081, 1088 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1989); Prosser & Keeton S 18, at 113 ("Consent 
avoids recovery simply because it destroys the wrongfulness 
of the conduct as between the consenting parties, however 
harmful it might be to the interests of others."); 
Restatement (Second) Torts S 892A ("One who effectively 
consents to the conduct of another intended to invade his 
interests cannot recover in an action of tort for the conduct 
or for the harm resulting from it.") Express consent may be 
given by words or affirmative conduct and implied consent 
may be manifested when a person takes no action, 
indicating an apparent willingness for the conduct to occur. 
Restatement (Second) Torts S 892 cmt. b & c. The consent 
must be to the "defendant's conduct, rather than to its 
consequences." Prosser & Keeton S 18, at 118. A plaintiff's 
consent is not effective if "the consenting person was 
mistaken about the nature and quality of the invasion 
intended by the conduct." Prosser & Keeton  S 18, at 114. 
 
Plaintiffs argued in the District Court that the court 
should use its equitable powers to bar defendants from 
asserting their affirmative defenses because of defendants' 
intentional and fraudulent conduct. See Barnes, 984 F. 
Supp. at 864-65. But the District Court rejected this 
argument and plaintiffs do not press it on appeal. Instead, 
plaintiffs argue there is no record evidence they consented 
to defendants' specific conduct. Defendants maintain 
plaintiffs knew they were exposing themselves to a 
hazardous substance yet continued to smoke. There is 
some evidence on the record, including plaintiffs' own 
deposition testimony, to support defendants' position that 
despite warnings, plaintiffs continued to smoke. See id. ("By 
her own admission, Potts learned `for sure' that cigarette 
smoking created an increased risk of disease in 1966, when 
the Surgeon General's warnings were put on cigarette 
packages. In addition, and more importantly, Ms. Potts was 
informed by her cardiologist in the late 1980s that she was 
at a significantly increased risk of contracting heart 
disease, in the form of clogged arteries, from smoking."). 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, plaintiffs may recover on a 
theory of strict liability where a product in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user 
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causes harm to the plaintiff. See Spino v. John S. Tilley 
Ladder Co., 696 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Pa. 1997). Plaintiff must 
prove the product was defective and the defect was a 
substantial factor in causing the injury. See id. While a 
defendant may not assert comparative negligence in a strict 
products liability action, see Kimco Development Corp. v. 
Michael D's Carpet Outlets, 637 A.2d 603, 606-07 (Pa. 
1993), Pennsylvania courts allow defendants to introduce 
"evidence of a plaintiff's voluntary assumption of the risk, 
misuse of a product, or highly reckless conduct . . . insofar 
as it relates to the element of causation." Charlton v. Toyota 
Indus. Equip., 714 A.2d 1043, 1047 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). 
To demonstrate that a plaintiff's actions are highly 
reckless, defendants must show plaintiff "knew or had 
reason to know of facts which created a high degree of risk 
of physical harm to himself or that he deliberately 
proceeded to act, or failed to act, in conscious disregard of 
that risk." Id. (citation omitted). 
 
Assumption of risk is also available in negligence claims. 
See Kaplan v. Exxon Corp., 126 F.3d 221, 224-25 (3d Cir. 
1997).26 In a negligence action, a defendant is relieved of 
his duty to protect the plaintiff when the plaintiff was aware 
of the risk and faced it voluntarily. See Barrett v. Fredavid 
Builders, Inc., 685 A.2d 129 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). The 
defendant must show that the "nature and extent" of the 
risk were "fully appreciated" and that the plaintiff 
voluntarily proceeded to face that risk. Childers v. Power 
Line Equip. Rentals, Inc., 681 A.2d 201, 208 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1996). 
 
Plaintiffs make essentially the same arguments regarding 
consent and assumption of risk, contending that because 
defendants concealed the nature and extent of their 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. In light of Pennsylvania's adoption of comparative negligence, see 42 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 7102(a), the existence of the assumption of the 
risk defense under Pennsylvania law is a matter of some debate. See 
Kaplan v. Exxon Corp., 126 F.3d 221, 223-25 (3d Cir. 1997). In Kaplan, 
we predicted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would incorporate 
assumption of the risk into the duty analysis. Therefore, it is a 
plaintiff's 
burden to establish that a defendant has a duty. This issue goes to the 
jury "unless reasonable minds could not differ." Id. at 225 (citation 
omitted). 
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conduct, no plaintiff can have consented to or assumed the 
risks of cigarette smoking. Therefore, consent and 
assumption of risk present no individual issues and can be 
resolved on a classwide basis. We are inclined to believe 
that individual considerations predominate here as well, 
but recognize that the question is a close one. Therefore we 
do not rely on the presence of individual issues with the 
defenses of consent and assumption of risk in reaching our 
decision to affirm class decertification. But we note other 
courts have permitted cigarette companies to assert 
affirmative defenses such as contributory negligence and 
assumption of risk. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 
F.2d 541, 559 (3d Cir. 1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 
505 U.S. 504 (1992) (remanded for jury to consider 
comparative fault issues); Horton v. The American Tobacco 
Co., 667 So.2d 1289, 1292 (Miss. 1995) (jury considered 
comparative fault and held that plaintiff was solely 
responsible for his injury); Gilboy v. The American Tobacco 
Co., 582 So.2d 1263, 1265 (La. 1991) (recognizing 
assumption of risk defense).27 
 
       d. Statute of Limitations 
 
Finally, we believe that determining whether each class 
member's claim is barred by the statute of limitations 
raises individual issues that prevent class certification.28 It 
is fundamental that a plaintiff must bring a claim before 
the applicable statute of limitations expires. Determining 
whether the statute of limitations has expired necessarily 
involves determining when it began to run. Under 
Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations starts running 
when the plaintiff's cause of action accrues; a medical 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
27. But see Wilks v. The American Tobacco Co., 680 So. 2d 839, 843 
(Miss. 1996) ("[We] find that the trial court properly struck the defense 
of assumption of the risk. . . . Even if it was a viable defense, it may 
not 
be employed unless the defendant admits the existence of a risk. 
[American Tobacco] firmly denied that smoking was hazardous to one's 
health.") 
 
28. We discuss our rationale for applying the statute of limitations 
rather 
than laches in affirming the grant of summary judgment against the 
named plaintiffs. For now, we describe only how the statute of 
limitations applies to the class. 
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monitoring claim accrues when the plaintiff suffers a 
"significantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent 
disease." Redland, 696 A.2d at 145. Under plaintiffs' 
analysis, a cigarette smoker suffers this risk when he 
reaches the ten or twenty "pack-year" level. A "pack-year" is 
equivalent to a year in which a person smokes a pack of 
cigarettes per day. To calculate a particular plaintiff's pack- 
year history, the court multiplies the number of packs of 
cigarettes the plaintiff smokes daily by the number of years 
he has smoked. For example, a person who has smoked a 
pack of cigarettes each day for twenty years has a twenty- 
pack year history; a person who has smoked a half a pack 
per day for twenty years has a ten pack-year history. Under 
the pack-year approach to claim accrual, determining when 
a plaintiff's claim accrued necessitates two individual 
inquiries for each plaintiff: when he began smoking and 
how much he has smoked since then. The need to conduct 
such a determination for each plaintiff augurs that a class 
action will devolve into a lengthy series of individual trials 
and therefore makes a class action an improper method for 
resolving these claims. 
 
Because of the individual issues involved in this case-- 
nicotine addiction, causation, the need for medical 
monitoring, contributory/comparative negligence and the 
statute of limitations--we believe class treatment is 
inappropriate.29 
 
C. Summary Judgment 
 
Having concluded the District Court did not abuse its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
29. In support of certification, plaintiffs point to other medical 
monitoring claims that have been certified under Rule 23(b)(2) or 
23(b)(3). See, e.g., Gibbs v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 876 F. Supp. 
475 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (exposure to chemicals); Yslava v. Hughes Aircraft 
Co., 845 F. Supp. 705, 713 (D. Ariz. 1993) (class alleging long-term 
exposure to contaminated ground water certified); Boggs v. Divested 
Atomic Corp., 141 F.R.D. 58, 67 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (long term exposure to 
radioactive materials and hazardous waste). Plaintiffs' case, however, 
presents numerous individual issues not involved in those cases. In 
addition, the cases plaintiffs cite all involve involuntary exposure to 
hazardous materials rather than the voluntary exposure involved in this 
case. 
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discretion in decertifying the class, we now turn to its order 
granting summary judgment against the six named 
plaintiffs. The court held the claims of five of the six 
plaintiffs--Barnes, Potts, Rodweller, Salzman and Slivak-- 
were barred by the statute of limitations. Because each has 
smoked for over thirty years, the court found they knew 
long before this suit was filed that smoking cigarettes put 
them at an increased risk of contracting a serious disease. 
See Barnes, 984 F. Supp. at 861-63. The court held the 
sixth plaintiff, Ciaran McNally, was not barred by the 
statute of limitations because, given her age and smoking 
history, her claims for monitoring did not accrue more than 
two years before this action was brought. Id. at 861 n. 14, 
864. But the court held that McNally had no cause of 
action for medical monitoring because the only monitoring 
she sought--routine physical examinations and 
cardiovascular risk assessment--was not different from that 
normally recommended in the absence of her particular 
exposure. See id. at 872. 
 
We will briefly set forth the medical and smoking history 
of the named plaintiffs, as summarized by the District 
Court: 
 
        Norma Rodweller has high cholesterol and a family 
       history of heart disease. She has been diagnosed with 
       vocal chord polyps and COPD, and has shown 
       abnormalities in pulmonary function tests. She has 
       also been tested for potential coronary insufficiency. 
       She nevertheless continues to smoke despite having 
       been told by doctors that smoking aggravates her 
       medical illnesses. She has also refused her doctor's 
       directions to obtain necessary medical screening such 
       as pap smears and mammograms. 
 
        Ciaran McNally is 26 years old. She has been a 
       regular smoker since she was 15 years old and smokes 
       10-15 cigarettes per day. She received chest x-rays 
       when appropriate in response to symptoms. She has 
       not followed her doctors' advice to quit smoking while 
       taking oral contraceptives. 
 
        William Barnes is mildly obese with hypertension 
       and elevated cholesterol. He has a history of coronary 
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       artery disease, and he has been diagnosed with 
       hypertensive atherosclerotic heart diseases. He is also 
       a heavy drinker. He has received EKGs, chest x-rays, 
       and pulmonary function testing as appropriate in 
       response to symptoms. He has been told to quit 
       smoking every time he visited his doctor, and 
       continues to smoke despite evidence of fibrosis of his 
       lung. 
 
        Catherine Potts has been diagnosed with COPD, 
       coronary heart disease, angina, hyperlipidemia, and 
       hypertension. She continues to smoke despite being 
       advised by her doctors to cease due to cardiac 
       problems and a potential vocal chord malignancy. She 
       has not followed her doctor's directions for testing, 
       including a recommended colonoscopy following rectal 
       bleeding. On one occasion, she insisted on being 
       discharged from the hospital against medical advice 
       after being diagnosed with possible myocardial 
       infarction. She continues to drink caffeinated beverages 
       despite being advised by doctors to cease doing so. 
 
        Edward Slivak has continued smoking despite 
       abnormal pulmonary function tests and abnormal 
       chest x-rays leading to a diagnosis of COPD. He has 
       high blood pressure and elevated cholesterol, has 
       received EKGs, and has been diagnosed with 
       myocardial infarction. Although he has been advised 
       repeatedly not to smoke due to his various medical 
       conditions, he is still smoking. 
 
        Barbara Salzman continues to smoke despite having 
       been diagnosed with emphysema and mild to moderate 
       COPD based on pulmonary function tests and chest x- 
       rays. She has received chest x-rays, MRI scans, and 
       EKGs in response to her symptoms. She has not, 
       however, mentioned her emphysema to her family 
       physician, explaining that she does not desire to follow- 
       up because "I don't like to look for trouble." She drinks 
       an excessive amount of caffeine and has a family 
       history of heart disease. 
 
Barnes, 984 F. Supp. at 854. 
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1. Statute of Limitations 
 
Looking to the underlying theories of liability--intentional 
tort, negligence, and strict products liability--the District 
Court applied a two-year statute of limitations,finding the 
claims accrued on the date when the plaintiffs were placed 
at a "significantly increased risk of contracting a serious 
latent disease." See Redland, 696 A.2d at 145. Plaintiffs 
faced this risk when, according to their experts' testimony, 
they had smoked for twenty pack-years. Rodweller reached 
this level in 1970, Salzman in 1976, Slivak in 1978, Barnes 
in 1990, and Potts in 1973. Therefore the court held the 
claim of each named plaintiff was barred by the statute of 
limitations. The court also found the discovery rule could 
not save plaintiffs' claims because each knew or should 
have known that smoking put him or her at a significantly 
increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease years 
before this lawsuit was filed. See Barnes, 984 F. Supp. at 
863-64. 
 
Plaintiffs contend the equitable doctrine of laches should 
apply, arguing their medical monitoring claim is analogous 
to a suit for nuisance abatement based in equity. Citing 
Simmons v. Pacor, 674 A.2d 232 (Pa. 1996) and Redland, 
plaintiffs maintain the Pennsylvania Supreme Court implied 
it would not apply the statute of limitations to a medical 
monitoring claim based on long-term exposure.30 But we 
discern no detectable direction from the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court that it would apply laches rather than the 
statute of limitations. 
 
As the District Court found, plaintiffs could have brought 
their claim at law or in equity depending on the type of 
relief sought. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
30. Plaintiffs point to the following language. In Simmons, the court 
found that "recovery for medical monitoring is appropriate and just" and 
that though plaintiffs' experts had recommended medical monitoring, 
plaintiff had "unfortunately" not sought the relief in the lawsuit. Id. at 
240. In Redland, the Court opined that "a medical monitoring trust fund 
is a more appropriate remedy than lump sum damages in mass exposure 
toxic tort cases. However, because the Redland Plaintiffs are seeking only 
a medical monitoring trust fund, we offer no opinion whether lump sum 
damages are recoverable under HSCA." Redland, 696 A.2d at 142-43 
n.6. 
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       If plaintiffs seek relief that is a disguised request for 
       compensatory (damages, then the medical monitoring 
       claim can only be characterized as a claim for 
       monetary damages. In contrast, if plaintiffs seek the 
       establishment of a court-supervised medical 
       monitoring program through which the class members 
       will receive periodic medical examinations, then 
       plaintiffs' medical monitoring claims can properly be 
       characterized as a claim seeking injunctive relief. 
 
Arch, 175 F.R.D. at 483. Plaintiffs themselves apparently 
believed their claim for medical monitoring seeks a legal 
remedy since both their original and first amended 
complaints requested money damages. 
 
Because plaintiffs could have brought their medical 
monitoring claim at law or in equity, the statute of 
limitations, not the doctrine of laches, applies. "[I]t is well 
established that equity will frequently follow the statute of 
limitations which controls analogous proceedings at law. 
This is especially, if not invariably, true if the cause of 
action is not exclusively cognizable in equity, which is the 
situation here . . . ." Ebbert v. Plymouth Oil Co., 34 A.2d 
493, 495-96 (Pa. 1943). Similarly, in Algrant v. Evergreen 
Valley Nurseries, Ltd., 126 F.3d 178, 181 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(citations omitted), we stated: "It is settled . . . that where 
legal and equitable claims coexist, equitable remedies will 
be withheld if an applicable statute of limitations bars the 
concurrent legal remedy." Because plaintiffs could have 
sought an award of damages, their decision to pursue a 
claim for a medical monitoring fund instead cannot deprive 
defendants of the statute of limitations defense. Statutes of 
limitations are primarily designed to assure fairness and 
"promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival 
of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence 
has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim 
it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend 
within the period of limitation and that the right to be free 
of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to 
prosecute them." Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway 
Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944); see also 
Carey v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D. 
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Ill. 1998) (holding medical monitoring claims barred by two- 
year tort statute of limitations). 
 
In predicting what statute of limitations the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would apply, we look to the theories of 
liability that underlie a medical monitoring claim. Under 
Redland, a plaintiff must prove that he was exposed to a 
proven hazardous substance as a result of the defendant's 
negligence. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 145-46. In 
Pennsylvania, a two-year statute of limitations applies to 
negligence actions. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5524. As 
noted, plaintiffs also allege intentional exposure to a 
hazardous substance and strict liability for manufacturing 
a defective product. To the extent that strict products 
liability or an intentional tort can act as the underlying 
theory of liability for a medical monitoring claim, the 
applicable statute of limitations would still be two years. 
See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5524.31 
 
Next we must decide when plaintiffs' claims accrued. 
Generally, a plaintiff "is under a duty to use all reasonable 
diligence to be properly informed of the facts and 
circumstances upon which a potential right of recovery is 
based and to institute suit within the prescribed statutory 
period." Pocono Int'l Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono Produce, 468 
A.2d 468, 471 (Pa. 1983). A claim under Pennsylvania law 
accrues at "the occurrence of the final significant event 
necessary to make the claim suable." Mack Trucks, Inc. v. 
Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co., 372 F.2d 
18, 20 (3d Cir. 1966). 
 
A plaintiff's medical monitoring cause of action accrues 
when he has been placed at a "significantly increased risk 
of contracting a serious latent disease." Redland, 696 A.2d 
at 145. To determine when that event occurred, we refer to 
the testimony of plaintiffs' experts. As the District Court 
noted, their experts proposed specific dates when plaintiffs 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
31. In Redland, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that "medical 
monitoring" plaintiffs must prove that defendant's negligence caused the 
exposure. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 146. We assume without deciding 
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would allow an intentional tort or 
strict products liability to be the underlying theory of liability in a 
claim 
for medical monitoring. 
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would be entitled to participate in the proposed medical 
monitoring program. Under the Petty-Hyers Program, a 
plaintiff would be entitled to medical monitoring when he or 
she reaches the "twenty pack-year" level. 32 
 
We agree with the District Court that five of the six 
named plaintiffs reached that level more than two years 
ago. Rodweller had been smoking one to one-and-a-half 
packs since 1953 and became a twenty pack-year smoker 
in 1970. Salzman had been smoking at least one-and-a-half 
packs per day for forty-one years and her claim accrued, at 
the latest, in 1976. Slivak had been smoking at least one to 
two packs per day for thirty-nine years and his claim 
accrued, at the latest, in 1978. Barnes had been smoking 
a pack a day since 1970 and his claim accrued in 1990. 
Potts had been smoking a pack a day since the early 1950s 
and her claim accrued no later than 1975. 
 
Absent an exception to the statute of limitations, the 
medical monitoring claims of these five plaintiffs are time- 
barred. The "discovery rule" is a "narrow exception to this 
general rule," Tohan v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 696 
A.2d 1195, 1200 n.4 (Pa. 1997), and tolls the statute of 
limitations during the "plaintiff's complete inability, due to 
facts and circumstances not within his control, to discover 
an injury despite the exercise of due diligence." Kingston 
Coal Co. v. Felton Mining Co., 690 A.2d 284, 288 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1997). Under the discovery rule, the statute of 
limitations begins to run when the "plaintiff knows, or in 
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, (1) 
that he has been injured, and (2) that his injury has been 
caused by another's conduct." Bradley v. Ragheb, 633 A.2d 
192, 194 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). The plaintiff has the burden 
of proving that he exercised reasonable diligence in bringing 
his claim. See Cochran v. GAF Corp., 666 A.2d 245, 249-50 
(Pa. 1995). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
32. We note that plaintiffs' other expert Dr. Burns proposes that 
monitoring begin before a person reaches the 20-pack year level. Dr. 
Burns suggests, for example, that a person who has smoked 15-20 
cigarettes for 10 years would be entitled to three of the seven proposed 
tests. Barnes, 984 F. Supp. at 860. In choosing the 20-pack year level 
as the accrual date, we, like the District Court, are erring in 
plaintiffs' 
favor by choosing a later date. 
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We agree with the District Court that the discovery rule 
does not save the claims of these five plaintiffs. Each 
plaintiff should have known that cigarettes put him or her 
at a significantly increased risk of contracting a serious 
latent disease years before this lawsuit was filed. As the 
District Court found: 
 
       - "Since the 1980s, every doctor seen by Mr. Barnes 
       for hypertension has told him to stop smoking. . . . 
       Dr. Brownstein, his doctor in the mid-1980s, took 
       Barnes' cigarettes and threw them away every time 
       Barnes came in for a visit. . . . Indeed, Mr. Barnes 
       stated that at the time of these visits in the 1980s, 
       he `kn[e]w that cigarettes are no good for you if you 
       have any type of lung disease. . . . Further, Mr. 
       Barnes stated that he believed that his father's 
       death from lung cancer was partially caused by 
       smoking . . . . Finally, Mr. Barnes testified at 
       deposition that none of the warnings on cigarettes, 
       which inform smokers of the risks of smoking, 
       provided him with any information that he already 
       did not possess. Based on these facts, it is obvious 
       Barnes knew that smoking caused him to be placed 
       at an increased risk of contracting a serious latent 
       disease by at least the mid-1980s.' " 
 
       - "By her own admission, Potts learned `for sure' that 
       cigarette smoking created an increased risk of 
       disease in 1966, when the Surgeon General's first 
       warnings were put on cigarette packages. In 
       addition, and more importantly, Ms. Potts was 
       informed by her cardiologist in the late 1980s that 
       she was at a significantly increased risk of 
       contracting heart disease, in the form of clogged 
       arteries, from smoking." 
 
       - "As early as 1959 . . . Rodweller was told by a 
       doctor that smoking would put scar tissue on her 
       vocal cords and it was in that year that she realized 
       that `cigarettes affected [her] body. . . .' Since this 
       time, Ms. Rodweller admits that all of her doctors 
       have advised her to quit smoking because `[i]t can 
       make [her] ill' and because `[she] was a good 
       candidate for emphysema.' " 
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       - "In the 1980s, one of Salzman's doctors told her to 
       stop smoking. The doctor explained, `it's really bad 
       for you, you can get emphysema, cancer . . . .' In 
       addition to being told by her doctors that she could 
       contract these diseases, Ms. Salzman urged her son, 
       throughout the 1980s, to quit smoking because of 
       the dangers of smoking." 
 
       - "After 1985, Mr. Slivak had read the warnings on 
       the packages of cigarettes. . . . In addition, in the 
       early 1980s, Slivak discussed with his family that 
       smoking may have been the cause of his wife's 
       cancer. Most importantly, Slivak's doctors connected 
       smoking to his heart disease." 
 
       - With respect to plaintiff McNally, the court 
       determined that, since she has only been smoking 
       for approximately 11 years, her claim could not 
       have accrued until sometime last year. FN 14. 
 
Barnes, 984 F. Supp. 862-63 & n.14. 
 
Plaintiffs argue the claims did not accrue when they were 
placed "at a significantly increased risk" of developing 
smoking-related illnesses. They claim instead that the 
"touchstone of accrual is the suffering of actual, 
demonstrable injury, not increased risk" and note that 
Pennsylvania courts have "expressly held that a plaintiff 
cannot sue for `increased risk.' " Similarly, they argue the 
court erred in invoking the discovery rule because there 
was no injury to discover since none had occurred. These 
arguments lack merit. If, as plaintiffs maintain, they have 
suffered no demonstrable injury--or even no injury at all-- 
then we would have to dismiss the case because it lacks an 
Article III case or controversy. See Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has held that the costs of periodic medical 
examinations necessary to detect the onset of physical 
harm, Redland, 696 A. 2d at 144, are a compensable injury 
even in the absence of physical harm. Plaintiffs' argument 
begs the question of when that injury accrued. Examining 
plaintiffs' claims, the District Court found the injury 
accrued when plaintiffs began needing medical monitoring. 
The District Court determined this date by looking at the 
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testimony of plaintiffs' own experts. We agree with the 
District Court's analysis.33 
 
Citing Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) and Fowkes v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 264 F.2d 
397 (3d Cir. 1959), plaintiffs contend the "continuing harm" 
doctrine should operate to toll the statute of limitations. In 
Page, the D.C. Circuit found 
 
       It is well-settled that `when a tort involves continuing 
       injury, the cause of action accrues, and the limitation 
       period begins to run, at the time the tortious conduct 
       ceases.' Since usually no single incident in a 
       continuous chain of tortious activity can `fairly or 
       realistically be identified as the cause of significant 
       harm,' it seems proper to regard the cumulative effect 
       of the conduct as actionable. Moreover, `since one 
       should not be allowed to acquire a right to continue the 
       tortious conduct,' it follows logically that statutes of 
       limitations should not run prior to its cessation. 
 
Page at 821-22 (citations omitted). There, the court applied 
the continuing tort doctrine to a claim by an army veteran 
that the army subjected him to harmful drugs. 
 
In Fowkes, we found the plaintiff's claim under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act was not barred by the 
three-year statute of limitations under a continuous harm 
theory. We noted 
 
       `If the relation is continuous, as in that of master and 
       servant, and the default is likewise continuous until 
       the cumulative effect produces disability in the form of 
       occupational disease, total or partial, the master's 
       failure to perform his duty . . . is regarded as a single 
       wrong continuing so long as the employment 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
33. We acknowledge this statute of limitations analysis leads to some 
"odd conclusions." For instance, with respect to Mr. Barnes' claim, we 
have held that it accrued in 1990 under the 20 pack-year rule but that 
he "discovered his injury five years before it accrued, in the mid-1980s 
when his doctor threw away his cigarettes." But the source of this 
seeming incongruity is our decision to err in favor of the plaintiffs in 
calculating the accrual date. In calculating Barnes' accrual date, we used 
the 20-pack-year level. This is the latest date suggested by plaintiffs. 
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       continues. Such wrong must therefore be redressed by 
       action brought within . . . (the statutory period) from 
       the time when the employment terminates.' 
 
Fowkes, 264 F.2d at 399 (citation omitted). 
 
In Kichline v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 800 F.2d 356 (3d 
Cir. 1986), however, in declining to apply the continuing 
harm doctrine to a FELA claim, we limited the applicability 
of Fowkes. In doing so, we specifically rejected the position 
now advanced by plaintiffs. We noted that in Fowkes, the 
"jury found specifically that the plaintiff was unaware that 
the physical condition for which he sought damages had 
existed for more than three years before the suit had been 
filed." Kichline, 800 F.2d at 359. We then stated: "We 
understand Fowkes to mean that continuing conduct of 
defendant will not stop the ticking of the limitations clock 
begun when plaintiff obtained requisite information. On 
discovering an injury and its cause, a claimant must 
choose to sue or forego that remedy." Id. at 360.34 Unlike 
this case, the discovery rule was not applicable in Fowkes 
because plaintiff did not know about his injury. But here, 
as we have discussed, there is unrefuted evidence that 
plaintiffs knew or should have known about their injury 
more than two years before filing suit. Under Kichline, the 
clock began to run when plaintiffs obtained the requisite 
information. 
 
2. Ciaran McNally 
 
The District Court also granted summary judgment 
against the sixth named plaintiff, McNally, finding she 
failed to demonstrate a need for medical monitoring. 35 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
34. While plaintiffs are correct that in Kichline we distinguished Page as 
an "intentional conduct case," Kichline, 800 F.2d at 360, we did not 
adopt Page as the rule in intentional tort cases. We believe our 
unequivocal adoption of the discovery rule in Kichline disposes of 
plaintiffs' argument. We further note that Page, unlike this case, 
involved 
involuntary exposure to a hazardous substance. 
 
35. Before reaching this issue, the District Court concluded defendants 
were not entitled to summary judgment on the issues of McNally's 
comparative negligence, assumption of risk, and consent. The District 
Court found genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to each 
defense. See Barnes, 984 F. Supp. at 868-70. 
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District Court found (1) under the Burns Program, McNally 
is only entitled to participate in the first level of the 
proposed monitoring program which includes regular 
physical examinations, cardiovascular risk assessment, and 
an EKG; (2) McNally only requested cardiovascular risk 
assessment and annual physical examinations and not 
EKGs; and (3) annual physical examinations and 
cardiovascular risk assessment are routinely recommended 
to all persons even in the absence of exposure. The court 
concluded that because McNally only seeks monitoring for 
two tests that would be recommended for her even if she 
did not smoke, "[a]ny increase in Ms. McNally's incremental 
risk of incurring the harm produced by the allegedly 
hazardous substances in cigarettes would not warrant a 
change in the medical monitoring that would be prescribed 
for her. Indeed, in the absence of exposure, it would be 
recommended that she receive the tests she seeks under 
her medical monitoring claim." Barnes, 984 F. Supp. at 
870-72. Therefore, the court reasoned, she cannot satisfy 
the sixth element of Redland because she cannot establish 
that "the prescribed regime is different from that normally 
recommended in the absence of the exposure." See id.36 We 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
36. The parties' briefs and the record demonstrate a great deal of 
confusion and disagreement on this issue. The dispute centers around 
what kind of monitoring program McNally requested and what kind of 
program plaintiffs' expert recommended for her. 
 
Dr. Burns made contradictory statements with respect to the 
appropriate program for McNally. In describing the different levels of 
monitoring, Dr. Burns recommended three tests for smokers at McNally's 
level (at least 25 years old and at least 10 years of smoking): (1) an 
EKG, 
(2) a cardiovascular risk factor assessment, and (3) a physical 
examination. But later in his affidavit Dr. Burns specifically stated 
McNally "should initially receive [cardiovascular risk assessment] and 
[physical examination]." He did not mention the EKG. Moreover, in 
plaintiffs' response to defendants' first set of interrogatories, McNally 
indicated she would only need cardiovascular risk factor assessment and 
physical examination and did not mention an EKG. 
 
McNally claims for the first time on appeal that Dr. Burns' report 
contains a typographical error. She claims paragraph 7 of the report 
inadvertently stated that only a cardiovascular risk factor assessment 
and a physical examination would be prescribed for her, and forgot to 
mention the EKG. She argues this error was "carried through" to the 
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agree with this reasoning and the District Court's decision 
to grant summary judgment against McNally. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
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interrogatory and contend the District Court erred by failing to recognize 
and resolve a resulting "tension" between the interrogatory answer, 
which neglected to mention the EKG, and the more general statement in 
Dr. Burns' second report that EKGs should be administered to persons 
25 or older who have smoked 10-15 cigarettes per day for 10 years. 
Defendants claim McNally waived this argument because she did not 
raise it below. We agree with defendants that this argument is waived. 
 
Alternatively, plaintiffs contend that Dr. Burns, in his expert report, 
stated that both tests--cardiovascular risk factor coupled with physical 
examination--were different from that normally prescribed and therefore 
satisfied the sixth element of Redland. We do not agree with plaintiffs' 
analysis of Dr. Burns' testimony. Dr. Burns said: "Cardiovascular risk 
factor assessment and a physical examination are measures that are 
recommended for all individuals to identify modifiable causes of heart 
disease including smoking. They are useful in preventing disease only for 
those who have an identifiable and modifiable risk factor. All smokers 
have an identifiable and modifiable risk factor, and the risk of disease 
increases synergistically when smokers have additional risk factors. 
Therefore, smokers have a particularly urgent need for this screening in 
comparison to the general population and will have a potential benefit 
that is substantially greater than the general population of smokers." 
Plaintiffs argue this statement supports the position that these tests 
were different from that normally prescribed for the general population. 
But as defendants contend, Dr. Burns' report indicates these are 
"measures recommended for all individuals." We also note Dr. Burns' 
deposition statement that "most organizations recommended screening 
for cardiovascular risk factors at almost any interaction with the health 
care system regardless of age." 
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